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Visual Activity Fields of Instruments in the Information Age*
Mauro Turrini†
The increasing concern about visual representation in science has
been usually converged on representations–photographs, diagrams,
graphs, maps–while instruments of visualization have been usually
neglected, because of the difficulty in concretely grasping their
effects on visualization. In this regard, the questions and concepts
formulated in the debate on digital visualization serve here as a starting
point to analyze the change in instrumental mediation triggered by
the introduction of computer-assisted imaging technologies in those
laboratories that traditionally have used and still use microscopes.
Empirical materials gathered during an ethnographic investigation of
Italian cytogenetics labs are here presented to show the visual spaces
provided bymicroscopes and digital systems as activity fields, which are
inhabited by and suggest in an either divergent or complementary way
specific practices, materials, organizations, epistemological orientations
and aesthetical preferences.
This paper intends to explore the introduction of computer-assisted imaging
technologies in scientific laboratories that traditionally have used—and still
continue to use—optical microscopes. The transition from optical to digital
imaging technologies is usually presented as a straightforward shi aimed at
both reducing time and cost, as well as increasing the accuracy of visualization
procedures. Instead, in the clinical cytogenetics case study, this passage has
generated tensions over the ways in which visual legibility is constructed
through the alternate optical spaces of microscopes or through the computer
screen. In this sense, cytogenetic laboratories (particularly Italian clinical
ones) represent an ideal area of investigation. Firstly, this discipline revolves
around the construction of visually legible chromosomes to be analysed, or
“read,” according to the lab’s vernacular. Secondly, cytogenetic procedures
of chromosome representations, although well-established, are still fraught
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with indeterminacies, which are always essential to overcome for diagnostic
purposes. Thirdly, the local and contingent strategies used are usually stratified
and consolidated in diverse “styles” (Turrini 2012), which have been kept
alive by the diversities which characterize the relatively large community of
cytogeneticists engaged in hospitals and clinics. This is particularly evident
in the highly fragmented context of Italian health service, where as of 2004
there were more than 160 cytogenetic labs.1 Within this plurality of styles of
visualizing chromosomes, what interests us are the ways in which optical and
digital viewing technologies are used differently according to the preferences
of lab heads or individual scientists. Computer-assisted imaging systems have
already been introduced to replace microphotography in the preparation of the
archival files that are produced for each diagnosis. However, thanks to the new
generation of soware, the role of the computer has progressively extended until
it has become crucial for the process of analysis itself. This raises questions about
the quality of digital visualization, which is seen at the same time as both more
accurate and more adulterated: digital visualization allows the observation of
something that is imperceptible through the microscope, but also introduces
artifacts into representations. As a result, while some scientists carry out almost
the whole analysis on the digital space of computer screen, others prefer the
optical space of microscope.
What is discussed here is not the resistance or skepticism towards the
stabilization of new digital technologies. Rather, the aim of this paper is to
examine the tensions between different imaging technologies and to delve
into the multiple interconnections between imaging technologies—particularly
their visual space as an activity field—and the embodied practices, procedures,
architecture, and organization which form the local order of a laboratory.
Studies of scientific visual phenomena have tended to focus on representations
(graphs, photographs, diagrams, maps and other inscriptions) understood
in their connection to a nexus of scientific practices, like observation,
measurement, description, and demonstration (e.g. Lynch and Woolgar 1990;
for a review see Lynch 1998), or in their effects on conceptions of truth, sight,
and evidence (e.g. Daston and Galison 1992; 2007; Joyce 2005; for a recent review
see Perroa 2012). The concern of the present paper, instead, is not to look at
the processes, or the nature and status of the images produced, but to explore
the practices and interconnections of the instrument of visualization, which is
to be considered as a space of intersubjectivity embedded in the texture of the
heterogeneous elements of a laboratory.
More specifically, the object of this analysis is how scientists themselves
1 The survey by Dallapiccola and colleagues on genetic tests in Italy has monitored the activity
of “88 clinical centres, 160 cytogenetic and 183 molecular genetic laboratories […] hosted by
256 structures” (Dallapiccola et al. 2006, 192).
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inhabit, organize, construct and question the social and material visual field
of activity provided or, in Gibson’s (1986) terms, “afforded” by microscopes
or computer-assisted imaging systems in use in cytogenetics. By focusing on
the ordinary methods that cytogeneticists use in their ordinary activities, this
paper draws upon the ethnography of science (Latour and Woolgar 1986;
Lynch 1985) and, more particularly, uses an ethnomethodological approach
to the understanding of knowledge practices involving the visual realm
(Lynch 1991). Aer a brief review of the academic discussion regarding
cyborg visuality, I will present empirical materials resulting from a two-year
ethnographic investigation in Italian clinical cytogenetics labs.2 This data shows
the many ways in which these two instrumental spaces—optical microscope and
computer screen—are characterized by specific and sometimes divergent work
practices, divisions of labour, and epistemological and aesthetical theories of
representation.
I. O  
Generally, the shi from analogue pictures, with their continuous spatial and
tonal variations alongwhich an indefinite amount of information is contained, to
digital images—which are simultaneously a precisely fixed array of “image data”
that can be manipulated, transmied, and replicated without degradation—has
challenged the authority of realism established by photography in favour of
a new kind of “visual truth” (Mitchell 1992). A similar change has been noted
by several sociological and historical investigations regarding the introduction
of computer-assisted imaging technologies in scientific and medical realms.
Investigating Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Amit Prasad (2005) showed that
digital imaging technologies, although sharing some similarities with analogue
imaging, bring the medical gaze into a “new visual regime,” called “cyborg
visuality.” Cyborg visuality works within a different framework of realism
that does not seek an “objective” or “mechanical reproduction” (Daston and
Galison 1992) of the observed object(s), but rather seeks a production of
differential, multiple, and partial viewings through the interaction between
humans and machines. Extending the argument of the manipulability allowed
by digital visualization, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2007) argued that
the introduction of new computer-assisted imaging technologies wrenches
the scientific image out of a long historical track centred on “objectivity,”
2 The observation was conducted between 2008 and 2009 in three clinical cytogenetics
laboratories in Italy: one large private lab, and two smaller public ones. The methodology
adopted was a participant observation; laboratory work routines were observed for a period of
sixmonths, in-depth “ethnographic” interviewswere conductedwith over twenty practitioners
including physicians, biologists and technicians, three courses were aended in order to
understand standardization in cytogeneticists’ laboratory routines, leading to the analysis of
protocols, guidelines and handbooks.
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according to which inherent properties of an object can be ascertained only
by means of a disciplined struggle against any observer’s intervention in
the representation provided by machines. Discussing virtual anatomical and
cuing-edge nanotechnologies of imaging, where pictures are used to alter the
physical world in real time, the two historians described this break in terms of a
shi from the image as a faithful representation of nature to the image as a tool
to make and change things. Imaging can then be seen as an interactive process
whereby “digital images are meant to be used, cut, correlated, rotated, coloured”
(Daston and Galison 2007, 383).
Michael Lynch analysed “opticism” and “digitality” in terms of
human/machine relationship and defined them as “technological complexes,”
whose paradigms are respectively “the lensed instrument and the scrutinized
eye,” and “the play of fingers (digits) on a keyboard instrument” (Lynch 1991,
62). He treated opticism and digitality as two particular Foucaldian discursive
formations that, even if associated with two distinct historical periods (the
Renaissance discovery of linear perspective and the computer age), were not
“incommensurable or discontinuous…[but rather] what Garfinkel has called
‘asymmetrical alternates.’” He argued that digitality was not totally new, but
yet may undermine opticism, while the opposite process is not possible. Discrete
representational techniques existed in earlier “optical” techniques. However,
in the visual space inhabited by the eyewitness of the photographic subject
(or the microscope user), “machines [stand] with authenticity” (Daston and
Galison 2007, 129). On the contrary, the advent of digital imaging technologies
has replaced the static field with a diachronic, interactive process, which may
underpin or simulate the operative conditions of opticism. As this work shows,
the introduction of digital visual technologies has introduced new questions
about the social analysis of representations. What is at stake is no longer the
nature and status of scientific representations, but rather the relationship
between imaging technologies and practices.
More recent studies on digital imaging have shed light on the important
role played by the computer screen as a place of intersubjective interaction
for scientists in the process of reconfiguring evidence. In her ethnography of
functional MRIs, Morana Alač (2008; 2011) has clearly shown the interaction
between practices of digital images and the production of scientific objects.
To rephrase the title of her monograph, visual representation opens up
new ways of handling scientific objects. Likewise, other works on digital
visualization have shown how the dynamic character of digital images has
to do not only with the way they are represented, but also with the ways
in which they are constructed and pragmatically treated as material objects
(Monteiro 2010a; Myers 2008). Drawing on this literature, the specificities of
the instrumental fields of two alternative imaging technologies–the microscope
and the computer–are analysed here as intersubjective spaces through which
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the concrete organization of the scientific laboratory is achieved and where
different manners of visualizing and viewing the same scientific objects—human
chromosomes—are deployed.
II. T         
Computer-assisted imaging systems were introduced in cytogenetics labs at
the end of the 1980s in order to reduce the time it takes to “karyotype”—i.e.
to prepare “karyograms.” Karyotyping is the final stage of the visualization
of chromosomes. Given that chromosomes are dynamic istological structures,
the process of representing them is articulated and labour-intensive. The
process consists of arresting their cycle of development at the point of division
(“metaphase”), then disentangling them from any other cellular materials that
may be mistaken for them, and finally staining them with dyes that highlight
the regions of interest. In a “metaphase plate,” chromosomes are messily spread
and are oen touching each other, overlapping or adjacent to non-chromosomal
material or to chromosome of another cell. We can see karyotyping as the
theoretical, classificatory space of order. Chromosomes are arranged by size in
pairs and classified according to their unique distinguishing characteristics, as
derived by position of “centromere” (the visible constriction in the centre) and
banding paern; more specifically “homologous” chromosomes are numbered
(for humans species from one to twenty-two), and “sexual” chromosomes are
identified by the leer X or Y (Fig. 1).
Figure 1. A Computer Monitor where the chromosomes spread in the metaphase plate (on the
le) are lined up in a karyogram (on the right). Photograph taken by the author with permission.
Microphotography—i.e. photographs taken with a microscope—has always
been the traditional method of chromosome visualization. Even if it is still
possible to see a 35 mm camera mounted on some old microscopes, this
technique was discarded in the 1990s, at least in Italian labs. Although a
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standard technique since the 1950s, this step has always been a burden in the
lengthy and artisanal process of chromosomes visualization. Firstly, this method
requires some understanding of the relationship between lens apertures, shuer
speeds, and depth of field. Since results could be variable, several separate
pictures must be taken to ensure that at least one was successful. Secondly,
and most important, chromosomes photographs need to be taken, developed,
printed–oen in a laboratory dark room or, especially for small labs, in an
ordinary photo studio–and materially “cut out” and “pasted” in class order into
a papery karyogram.
Nowadays, karyotypes are created on a screen by means of a digital
imaging workstation—a computer platform that integrates the microscope
with a black-and-white video camera, a digitiser board, and data archive
devices. Creating digital images is almost instantaneous and requires lile
or no photographic expertise. Moreover, in recent years a wide range of
soware packages especially designed to address the specific requirements of
cytogenetics practices, such as Cytovision and CromoWinPlus, have been used
to capture, classify, and enhance images. However, what happens in everyday
activities is not that simple. While image acquisition is easy and effective,
chromosome classification has a very poor success rate for the generation
of karyotypes, even with so-called last-generation “fully automated digital
systems.” Not surprisingly, these features are generally bypassed or used just
to make a “first pass” at arranging chromosomes in pairs, which are then
reclassified by individually dragging and dropping them to their proper place.
By replacing the classical toolbox of film, photographic paper, developer, scissor,
glue, and the bench with a few easy devices like the digitiser board, keyboard,
and mouse, the digital system “can be seen as one of the most important
developments in automation of the cytogenetics laboratory,” as an authoritative
cytogenetics handbook neatly points out (Gersen and Downey 2005, 120).
The dramatic reduction of time and cost that these technologies allow
is universally deemed an improvement and have assured them an increasing
popularity. Their other second noteworthy feature, namely the capacity to
expand chromosome visibility and analysability, is instead more controversial.
Image enhancement features have rapidly evolved in the last years and now
include features to eliminate unwanted cellular material in the background,
to adjust brightness, contrast and colour, and even straightening, scaling, or
aligning chromosomes in order to allow direct comparison among chromosomes
of different cells. As a marketing manager for several genetic image-analysis
products puts it clearly in an article addressed to biologists, the novelty of these
new technologies should not be reduced to an increase in speed of results, but
should also be seen as a substantial change in the quality of images,accuracy and
presentation (Gee 2001). Digital imaging platforms aim not just at automating
cytogenetics procedures, but at something more: by intervening in the actual
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analysis, they try to provide a perceptual field alternative to that of the microscope.
This change at the same time fascinates and troubles biologists. Drawing on the
distinctive ethnomethodological meaning of “reflexivity” (Garfinkel 1967), we
explore how the different uses of a new technology of visualization contingently
reconfigure both the heterogeneous social and material visual fields in which
representations are composed and used, and the theories of representation
inextricably tied to them.
III. P, , ,    
    
The activity of scrutinizing chromosomes can vary considerably. Peering into
a microscope inhibits head and body movements, as well as any uerances.
Not only is the microscopist immobilized and silent, but the visual field
is also static, only allowing one to operate the focusing knob in order to
emphasize the tridimensionality of chromosomes, which, like sticks, have a
cylindrical form. In contrast, the digital visual field provided by the computer
screen does not compel the observer and the object to be frozen. Once
cells have been selected (by the microscope) and captured, digital systems
require different representational practices, which consist in using a computer
mouse to alter contrast, brightness, and straightening, to zoom, and to
compare chromosomes. Usually, those who privilege on-screen analyses also
develop more advanced computer literacy, and tend to manually modify the
adjustment acquisition parameters—i.e. gain, off-set, and exposure. In addition,
the computer displays the image on a large flat surface available to more
than one person simultaneously, allowing biologists to point out interesting
features to each other. The computer screen thus serves as a dynamic, public
space where multiple viewpoints can be reconciled at the same time and where
controversial or curious cases can be shared more easily with colleagues or
modified collectively (e.g. “try to increase contrast”). Several works on digital
visuality have explored interactivity in the process of visualization and viewing
that was introduced first and foremost by the intersubjective space provided by
computer screens. During my ethnographic experience, I myself have benefited
from this opportunity, which has unquestionably enriched my capacity to
be acquainted with the subtle processes of visualization. In fact, I observed
cytogeneticists’ activities only when they were working on-screen, while I have
second-hand information regarding the interaction between scientists and the
microscope: in the best of situations they explained to me what they were doing
with an instrumental field that was inaccessible to me.3
In any case, bothmicroscopes and digital platforms provide two instrumental
3 In a pre-digital era, large laboratories were equipped with multifocal microscopes that were
used to teach students how to peer into the microscope.
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perceptual fields, which are here understood as intersubjective sites of the
organization of the material arrangement of workplace. For example, in labs
where the primacy of the microscope over the computer is set as a general
rule, all practitioners usually choose to stain chromosomes with a fluorescence
dye, called “quinacrine mustard,” which is more visible in a darkened room.
Therefore, the environment of these labs is impressively dim and silent, totally
different from the brighter and more communicative (and noisy) workplace
of the labs that use “Giemsha,” another dye generally associated with digital
imaging technologies. The visual space that these instruments of visualization
allow—or, in Gibson’s terms, “afford”—defines and is defined by the coherent and
heterogeneous texture of embodied practices, procedures, materials, (reagents,
biosample etc.) and organization that constitutes the social and material order
of a laboratory. These different spaces are unquestionably divergent, however;
even if they collide, they can also coexist without any frictions.
According to my interviewees, this was particularly true in the early
days of the introduction of digital imaging technologies, when these two
perceptual spaces were used for different tasks. Each cytogenetic diagnostic
referral is constituted of two kinds of reporting data or, in Latour’s (1990)
terms, “inscriptions.” The first is a brief textual code consisting in the number
of chromosomes, the sexual chromosomes and, if present, the anomaly. For
example, a female human without genetic aberration is reported as “46, XX”,
a man with a third anomalous chromosome 21 (the Down syndrome) as
“47, XY +21”. The second kind of inscription is the karyotype: in a single
visual field, it juxtaposes the actual chromosomes obtained in the lab with a
bio-sample in alphanumerical order (from 1 to 23 plus X and Y) for the rigorous,
replicable standard classification (see Figure 1). These are the final results of
two different tasks. Basically, codes are produced by an actual analyses of the
chromosomes, while karyotypes are prepared (usually aer the accomplishment
of the interpretative work) to be kept in the archive to guarantee the quality and
correctness of analysis. In clinical cytogenetics labs, visual displays are more
than pictorial illustrations for textual inscriptions; in fact, they are the most
reliable evidence in case of a lawsuit against the medical lab.
This distinction is also reflected in the requirements of scientific-professional
guidelines. For example, according to the Italian Society of Human Genetics
(Sigu 2007, 7), for a prenatal diagnosis using amniotic fluid aminimum of 16 cells
should be fully analyzed, and for only three of them (usually “the nicest” ones)
the karyogram should be prepared. For some years this division of labour was
congruent with a division of instruments uses. The analyses of metaphases were
usually done bymicroscope, and definitely not by importing all images on digital
systems, which, instead, were used only to produce more easily and promptly
the karyotypes to be archived. As a cytogeneticist working in a Department on
Human Genetics of a University hospital described it:
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In our lab we have chosen to not intervene on chromosome…
with computer, I mean. When we import images on computer, in
some cases, we regulate contrast, brightness and so forth. However,
the less artifice is the beer. It is like removing red-eyes with
Photoshop.
This statement of one of my informants, an experienced cytogeneticist who we
will call Dr. Variale, is representative of Italian cytogeneticists. Even if certain
labs that are more open to digital technologies exist, the extension of digital
systems is discarded by many cytogeneticists as a dangerous shortcut—an
easier and faster, but less accurate, manner of performing analysis. Since
performing on-screen analyses is less demanding, and adjusting karyotypes
can be reassuring, the use of computer-assisted systems is considered by these
labs as a sort of cheating, and likened to photoshopping. According to this
approach, microscopes are considered a more reliable source of data, while
digital systems are considered more powerful systems that can be exploited
for their capacity to rearrange and replicate images. The use of the computer
is thus limited to the production of visual displays to be archived. Managing
the instrumental visual fields of activity implies not only an organization of
the practices, bodies, workplace arrangements, and materials, but also different
constructions of representational truth, as the following words of a cytogenetics
laboratory director clearly show:
It seems to me that, when you straighten chromosomes, their
bands are modified. They are all preier but, in my opinion, some
bands are reduced and others enlarged. I never do it. […] Actually,
these chromosomes are more photogenic [laughs]. They are glossy
[patinati] chromosomes, but they don’t convince me.
In this quotation two different interwoven arguments are clearly
distinguishable. First, the manipulability and plasticity of digital systems
raise an epistemological question. These technologies are considered to be both
an opportunity to increase the quality of an image and a potential source of
distortions and artefacts that tends to simplify and to flaen images. On the
contrary, focusing in and out while peering into microscope is perceived as
a method that is more faithful to reality. This concern becomes particularly
urgent in controversial cases, when one needs to decide in which instrumental
visual field an unclear chromosomal arrangement is to be solved, and to which
extent it is possible to alter the gradation of greys in order to bring out a
banding paern. According to the words of the director, only one instrument
has “the last word,” and that depends on the epistemological primacy—either of
the microscope or of the digital system—assumed by a cytogeneticist in her own
work routines. A second element, which is well illustrated in both quotations, is
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a question of aesthetic preferences. In this regard, Dr. Variale’s lab moo—“the
less artifice the beer”—is similar to the lab chief’s suspicion towards “glossy”
and “more photogenic” chromosomes. These aesthetic dispositions result from
contrasting “colour enhanced” and “straightened” digital chromosomes with
the more nuanced, tridimensional chromosomes of microscope, which are
perceived as more realistic.
Again, we can see a correspondence between the assumptions of the theories
of representation embedded in these practices and the division of labour.
Organizational analysis raises epistemological questions, and karyotyping
practices raise aesthetic preferences. Even if there is a connection between
the two options, a “realist” epistemology does not necessarily entail a
“hyper-realistic” aesthetics. For example, in Dr. Variale’s lab–where, as we have
already seen, only a mild visual enhancement of chromosomes is allowed–the
most uncertain and controversial cases are solved by “playing with the
computer.” However, as Dr. Variale specifies, the only biologist allowed to use
the computer in this manner is the director himself. Diffidence towards the
visual rendering of features of imaging soware is inevitably associated with
a “hierarchical” organization of their use.
IV. C
In a recent review essay on practices of seeing, Charles Goodwin pointed
out that aer the deep influence of ethnomethodology on representations
in scientific practice, “research in science studies has investigated the images
produced by scientists and the way they visually and mathematically structure
the world that is the focus on their inquiry” (Goodwin 2000, 160). His main
analytic concern is with the absence ofmateriality and the viewing bodies, which
in fact play a major role in the process of visualization. Marko Monteiro (2010b)
has advanced this criticism of the limitations of understandings of scientific
representations by pointing out the crucial role that is played by digital images
in the process of scientific visualization—or “digital objects,” as they are called to
emphasize their social materiality deployed in their interactions with scientists.
As we have already mentioned, cyborg visuality has provided an interesting
way to appreciate the role of embodied practices and the relationship between
humans and instruments (computers) in the process of visualization (eg. Alač
2008; 2011; Monteiro 2010a; Myers 2008).
This paper insists on the similarly neglected aspect of the materiality
of visualization—the instrument of visualization. Even ethnographic studies
concerned with how practices, tools, and documents used by scientists make
natural phenomena visible have scarcely paid aention to how the perceptual
field of an instrument is part and parcel of the heterogeneous and socio-material
contexts where representations are produced. On the contrary, the space of
action of visualization instruments is a relevant field of activity where specific
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practices, materials, organizations, epistemological orientations, and aesthetic
preferences are connected with each other. At the same time, visualization
instruments are usually elements that are taken for granted, considered
to be part of a black box that is difficult to open. A scientific field like
cytogenetics, where two different instruments are used simultaneously to
visualize the same objects (chromosomes), gives us the opportunity to single
out the specificities of microscope and digital system through their either
divergent—even conflicting—or complementary relationship. In the current
situation of technological change, the different and sometimes competing uses
of these instruments become a source of reflexivity. The changes triggered
by a process of innovation offer an ideal situation to observe the ways in
which the varied courses of representational activities become heterogeneously
ordered, accountable, and natural. The same materiality of chromosomes is
shaped through these processes as the result of interactions with these new
technologies and the new visual practices. Both optical and digital instruments
take part in contingent and yet meaningful ways in the practical organization
of work, division of labour, arrangement of workplaces, professional hierarchy,
degrees of representational truth, and resemblance to nature. The contemplative
relationship between observer and research object embedded in the microscope
can be seen either as a resource or a fallacy, and it is thus considered
contingently. Accordingly, this analytical perspective moves opticism and
digitality from the unavoidable trajectory of technological innovation to the
configuration that their related and juxtaposed visual activity fields assume
in relation to each other in concrete activities. For the study of scientific
visualization, digital technologies are thus interesting not only as cuing-edge
technological innovations with which to represent and intervene in reality, but
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